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RECENT CASES
matic.' 8 Practically speaking, the probability that sharp declivities
will exist in an artificial body of water created by drainage into an
excavation is considerably greater than the possibility that such de-
clivities will be found in a natural formation.' The courts in a limited
number of jurisdictions have allowed recovery in situations closely
analogous to the facts in the principal case' based on the unnatural
hidden dangers involved." In Sanchez v. East Contra Costa Irrigation
Co.," the court stated that even though the children assumed the risk
of a body of water they did not assume the risk of an unknown and
unguarded hole in the bottom of that body. The objection that liability
imposed upon the owner of land would create hardship upon that
owner may be answered by pointing out that all the attractive nuis-
ance doctrine imposes is the duty to exercise reasonable care. The
courts which have allowed recovery in such cases do not appear to
have worked a hardship or to have imposed unreasonable duties upon
land owners.
It is self-evident that a blanket extension of the attractive nuisance
doctrine to include a whole new general field would be indiscreet.
However, a limited application of the doctrine, covering situations
wherein the danger is great and could be easily or inexpensively
remedied, should not be a violation of our historical concepts of pro-
perty.
Daniel Twitchell
WILLS-DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-RIGHT OF MUR-
DERER'S HEIRS TO INHERIT FROM VICTIM. A Kentucky statute'
precluded petitioner's father from inheriting property from his par-
s 92 N.E.2d at 641.
9 See. e.g.. such cases as Sanchez v. East Contra Costa Irrigation Co., 205
Cal. 515, 271 Pac. 1060 (1928) (syphon in bottom of canal); Saxton v.
Plum Orchards, 215 La. 378, 40 So.2d 791 (1949) (steep bank hidden
under water of artificial pond).
10 Coeur d' Alene Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 215 Fed. 8 (9th Cir. 1914)
(child drowned in cistern covered by water); Malloy v. Hibernia Sav. &
Loan Soc., 3 Cal. Unrep. 716, 21 Pac. 525 (1889) (sewage pit); Indian-
apolis v. Williams, 58 Ind. App. 447, 108 N.E. 387 (1915) (hole in bed
of natural stream caused by sewage discharge; municipal corporation liable
the same as a person if negligent); Indianapolis v. Emmelman, 108 Ind. 530,
9 N.E. 155 (1886) (excavation in bed of natural stream); Saxton v. Plum
Orchards, supra note 9; Tucker v. Draper, 62 Neb. 66, 86 N.W. 917
(1901) (well); Bjork v. City of Tacoma, 76 Wash. 225, 135 Pac. 1005
(1913) (wooden flume with trap door in bottom).
City of Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141, 39 N.E. 484 (1895) (log float-
ing upon pool; where some factor other than the mere existence of the
pool attracts the children there is recovery); Kansas City v. Siese. 71 Kan.
283, 80 Pac. 628 (1905) (structure on pond); Price v. Atchison Water
Co., 58 Kan. 551, 50 Pac. 450 (1897) (structure upon the water).
12 205 Cal. 515, 271 Pac. 1060 (1928).
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 381.280 (1946): "If the . . . heir-at-law . . . takes the
life of the decedent and is convicted therefor of a felony, the person so
convicted forfeits all interest in and to the property of the decedent . . .
and the property interest so forfeited descends to the decedent's other
heirs-at-law, unless otherwise disposed of by the decedent."
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ents, whom he had murdered. Subsequent to the acts of murder but
prior to his conviction therefor, the murderer mortgaged to defendants
his undivided interest in his parents' property. In a prior suit brought
by the murderer's brother (the only other child of the murdered
couple) against the mortgagee, it was held, that the conviction related
back to the time of the murderous acts so that the murderer had
nothing to mortgage.2 Subsequently, the felon's four-year-old daugh-
ter, through her guardian, became a party to the action. She claims
the share of her grandparents' estate to which her father would have
been entitled, while the convict's brother claims all the estate as sole
heir-at-law. The court held, that for the purposes of inheritance the
murderer has predeceased his parents whom he killed and his daugh-
ter is entitled to take his share of the estate under the statutes of
descent and distribution.! Bates v. Wilson, 232 S.W.2d 837 (C.A. Ky.
1950)
Modern statutes have reaffirmed the common law doctrine that the
murderer shall not profit by sharing in his victim's estate.' Early
American cases decided after the adoption of statutes of descent and
distribution were not entirely in accord with this principle, however.'
Courts were reluctant to read implied exceptions into the statutes of
descent with the inevitable result that the murderer inherited from
one whose death he caused.! This obviously repugnant conclusion was
thought by some courts to be the signal for more equitable construc-
tion of the statutes of descent,' by others a signal for legislative ac-
tion.' The subsequent decisions, in their efforts to disinherit the mur-
derer, have followed three lines of reasoning. One group of courts,
following precedent which dates back to the 1888 decision of Owens
v. Owens' holds that the legal and equitable title to the property must
pass to the murderer under the statutes of descent and whatever
change is needed must come from the legislature." A second theory,
first set out in Riggs v. Palmer" is that to allow title to pass to the
murderer under the statutes of descent would be contrary to public
policy; courts which follow this reasoning find an implied legislative
Wilson v. Bates, 313 Ky. 333, 231 S.W.2d 39 ('1950).
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 391.010 (1946): "When a person having right or title
to any real estate or inheritance dies intestate as to such estate, it shall
descend in common to his kindred, male and female, in the following or,
der . . . (1) To his children and their descendants; . . ."See 27 Texas Law Review 551 (1949), where it is said that about half
of the states have statutes covering this situation, readopting the view held
at the English common law as expressed in Re Sigsworth, (1935) Ch.
(Eng.) "89.
Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N.W. 935 (1894) (title vest-
ed in murderer co instanti); Owens v. Owens, 100 N.C, 240, 6 S.E. 794
(1888) (widow who murdered husband got dower).
Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914); Deem v. Mil,
likin, 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 491 (1892).
Riggs v. Palmer. 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (1889); cf. Ellerson v.
Westcott, 148 N.Y. 149, 42 N.E. 540 (1896).
McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112 (1906).
100 N.C. 240. 6 S.E. 794 (1888), subsequently changed by statute.
" Hagan v. Cone, 21 Ga. App. 416, 94 S.E. 602 (1917); Wall v. Pfan-
schmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914); McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan.
533, 84 Pac. 112 (1906); Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S.W.
487 (1916); Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N.W. 935 (1894).
115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
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intent to disinherit the murderer in statutes which are otherwise un-
ambiguous' A third and much smaller group of courts, supported by
a good majority of the legal writers," have taken the view that the
legal title passes under the statutes of descent and distribution but
that the murderer holds the property in constructive trust for the
decedent's heirs.' No courts, however, have held that an insurance
beneficiary can collect where he has caused insured's death."
While today it is generally agreed that the slayer should not inherit
from his victim, the courts disagree upon who takes the murderer's
share. A few courts have refused recovery to the murderer's heirs, as-
serting that if the slayer cannot recover, those claiming through him
are also precluded." The two decisions which most nearly approach
the precise issue of the instant case do not support it. The Oregon
case of In re Norton's Estate," embracing precisely the same fact situ-
ation and a similar statute, held that the statute served only to dis-
qualify the slayer as an heir and did not empower the court to create
new heirs; thus the son of the murderer was refused a share in his
grandmother's estate. The result of the instant case was reached in
Rasor v. Rasor," where the grandchildren were allowed to inherit; but
the decision is based upon a statute, clearly stating that the children
of the slayer should take the felon's share.
The decision in Riggs v. Palmer" has been severely criticized in sub-
sequent opinions because of its spurious construction of the statute
involved.' Much of the same criticism can be directed at the Kentucky
Garwol's v. Bankers Trust Co., 251 Mich. 420, 232 N.W. 239 (1930);
Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908); Price v.
Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 Atd. 470 (1933) Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn.
393, 79 S.W. 1042 (1904).
13 Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory
Solution, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 715 (1936); Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty-
in New York, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q. 270, 461 (1945); 64 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
307 (1916).
14 Whitney v. Lott, 134 N.J. Eq. 586, 36 A.2d 888 (1944). Bryant v.
Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927).
N.Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886).
Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 At. 470 (1933); Perry v. Straw,
bridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908).
" 175 Ore. 115, 151 P.2d 719 (1944).
173 S.C. 365, 175 S.E. 545 (1934).
1' 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
See Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S.W. 487, 489 (1916)
(". . . the statute of descent and distribution declare (sic) the public
policy of this state . . .That policy cannot be changed to conform to the
court's idea of justice or of natural right."); Deem v. Millikin, 3 Ohio Cir.
Dec. 491 (1892) (commenting on the Riggs v. Palmer case: "The de-
cision ... is a manifest assertion of wisdom believed to be superior to
that of the legislature...")
1 N. D. Rev. Code § 56-0423 (1943).
-- See Rasor v. Rasor, 173 S.C. 365, 175 S.E. 545 (1934). Also, Kan. Gen.
Stat. § 22-133 (1935); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-119, 30-120 (1943); Page's
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. § 10503-17 (1926-1935 Supp.).
-. Bates v. Wilson. 232 S.W.2d at 838: "1 cannot believe that it was the
intention of the legislature of Kentucky to deny the right to inherit the
estate to an innocent child, even though the child is a daughter of the
person who committed the murder."
"' Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202, 208 (1875).
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court in the instant case, which when faced with the unambiguous
directive to distribute the estate of the murdered couple to the other
heirs-at-law exclusive of the murderer, took upon itself the right to
create new heirs. However, in declaring that the murderer predeceas-
ed his victims, a course which North Dakota' and other jurisdic-
tions" have chosen to take by statute, the court has reached a com-
mendable result. Aside from the reasoning in the instant case, which
appears to be founded as much upon emotional as legal considera-
tions," it is arguable that the innocent children of murderers should
not be made to suffer because of the iniquity of their parents. It was
for this reason that forfeitures were originally abolished. ' Statutory
solutions such as that found in North Dakota' achieve the result of dis-
qualifying the murderer from inheritance and at the same time dis-
tributing his victim's estate in accord with the spirit of the corruption
of blood and forfeiture provisions." Similarly, application of the con-
structive trust theory would also appear to satisfy the requirements
of the law and public policy."
Daniel J. Chapman.
' N.D. Rev. Code § 56-0423 (194-3): "No person who has been finally
convicted of feloniously causing the death of another shall take or re-
ceive any property . . . by succession, will, or otherwise, but all property
of the deceased . . . shall vest as if the person convicted were dead when
the testator died."
Constitution of Kentucky § 20: "No person shall be attainted of treason
or felony by the General Assembly, and no attainder shall work corrup
tion of blood, nor, except during the life of the offender, forfeiture of
estate to the commonwealth." (Similar provisions are found in most other
jurisdictions.)
27 Compare Whitney v. Lott, 134 N.J. Eq. 586, 36 A.2d 888 (1944), with
Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914).
